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Legal profession represents a key labor sector whether in politics or business 
in any developed or underdeveloped country. What resources do lawyers use for 
matching the demand to their own services’ supply? Private sector lawyers make 
use of their level of human capital and their social capital for this to be 
accomplished. This work makes a literature survey focusing on legal profession 
and their relationships with these capital dimensions. Particular interest is given to 









Keywords: human capital, social capital, lawyers 
JEL Classification System: J41, J43, A12 
 
                                                 
* Juan M.C. Larrosa is Professor in Economics at the Department of Economics at 
Universidad Empresarial Siglo 21, (Córdoba, Argentina) and Fellow of CONICET 
(National Council for Scientific and Technical Research) of Argentina: email 
jlarrosa@criba.edu.ar. His interest center on interdisciplinary studies on social capital and 
social network topics and on the economic importance of legal profession. The present 
paper has been finished thanks to Carroll Seron, Fiona Kay, William Felstiner, John Heinz, 
Brian Uzzi and James Baron who kindly provided me with reading material. I also 
appreciate the excellent predisposition of Felipe Fucito and Marcelo Delajara for 
discussing several issues.  2  Juan M.C. Larrosa [24-Feb-05 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper surveys theoretical, empiric (and quantitative and qualitative) 
contributions that deal with the influence of two individual capital 
dimensions on lawyers’ professional performance: human and social 
capital. Namely, the level of knowledge they acquired and the relationships 
they make for dealing with professional practice. Initially both take part of 
the acquisition process for the degree license. However, once in the labor 
market, interaction between both forms of capital opens diverse and rich 
layers of analysis. For instance, market size (jointly with another 
constraints) conditions the organizational structure and human capital 
formation procedures. Inside big markets, competition emerges and 
becoming specialist use to pay better than to remain as generalist. But also 
in big markets competition rewards client-getting tasks, so social capital 
acquisition is also better pay.  
This work is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews specific legal 
professional issues that would important for the rest of the paper. Section 2 
gives an introduction to human capital topics and describes main findings. 
Section 4 uses a similar framework for describing social capital findings. 
Section 5 studies complementarities issues between two capital dimensions. 
Section 6 concludes the survey. 
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2. ISSUES ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION EVOLUTION  
Legal profession has been usually associated with government, politics, 
and business in almost any modern society. Like every profession, it has 
emerged from task specificity. Historically, lawyers acquired political 
relevance at the time monarchies fall. During republican life their 
knowledge was appreciated and lawyers became indispensable for public 
affairs’ organization and administration. Finally, a constitutional power of 
the state would be settled only for members of this profession, political 
parties would take advantage of the social status and educational level of 
these professionals for office formation with many of them succeeded in 
conforming new governments.
1,2 However, private professional practice has 
witnessed profound changes during the last decades. 
Law firm research has received strong academic interest due to the 
growing importance of the profession in economic life. For instance, the 
percentage of USA’s GPD allocated in legal compensations has triplicate in 
the last 30 years (from 1.1 to 3.5%.) The causes of this increment can be 
attributed to factors combination, the main two could be:  
                                                 
1 For instance, it has been detected current preeminence of this profession among 
counselors and representatives in the parliament of Argentina. See A.L. Gastrón, Dime 
quién eres... ¡y te diré con quién andas! Un perfil educativo de los legisladores y asesores 
parlamentarios en la Argentina, Reforma política para la República, Buenos Aires, mimeo, 
2003 (in Spanish) and A.L. Gastrón, De leyes, sospechas y pizarrones: El perfil educativo 
de los senadores de la Nación, Reforma política para la República, Buenos Aires, mimeo, 
2003 (in Spanish).  
2 A sketch of the political influence of liberal profession members in developing countries 
could be seen in E.A. Krause, Professional Group Power in Developing Societies, 
CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 49, 2001. 4  Juan M.C. Larrosa [24-Feb-05 
(i) Through a long and extremely competitive process American big 
law firms reached an organizational transformation that allow them 
industrial-level billings (increasing internal technology), and  
(ii) American legal system has been acquiescent in accepting billion 
dollars lawsuits, which has created strong economic incentives for 
career choice of many professionals (increasing supply and demand 
of services.)
3  
In a parallel way, it has been observed across developed and 
undeveloped countries a considerable augment of the yearly quantity of 
lawyers accessing the job market while in this case no such strong 
economic incentives persist. In the American case, as described by Heinz 
and colleagues, lawyers fraction in USA increased from 1/572 in 1971 to 
1/303 lawyer per inhabitant in 1995, while from 1972 to 1992 charges for 
legal services increased also from 37 to 101 billions in constant dollars.
4 In 
Latin America, a similar trend is observed with an increase in the number of 
graduates throughout the subcontinent
5 while there is no available data on 
litigated amounts. This trend includes China
6 showing even a slightly 
                                                 
3 See H.M. Kritzer, The Fracturing Legal Profession: The Case of Plaintiffs' Personal 
Injury Lawyers, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 8, 2001 at 226. 
4 See J.P. Heinz, E.O. Laumann & R.L. Nelson, The Scale of Justice: Observations on the 
Transformation of Urban Law Practice, ANNUAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 27, 2001. 
5 See R. Pérez Perdomo, LOS ABOGADOS EN LATINOAMÉRICA: UNA INTRODUCCIÓN 
HISTÓRICA, (Santiago de Chile Press, 2002) (in Spanish) at 128. 
6 See E. MICHELSON, UNHOOKING FROM THE STATE: CHINESE LAWYERS IN TRANSITION, 
Department of Sociology, The University of Chicago, PhD thesis, 2003 at 476. 24-Feb-05]   CONNECTIONS, SPECIALIZATION, & LAWSUITS  5 
increase in Cuba.
7 In the case of Latin American countries also, law careers 
produce the largest quantity of graduates.
8 
This bias in career choice has been substantially sustained upon the 
improvement in education access rate across the World in the last decades, 
including university education. Given that professional services sector is 
intensive in human capital, it has become the main absorbent of these 
incoming qualified labor worker flows. Though at the end, there is still lack 
of academic research that explains why this phenomenon seems to be 
universal. 
Sociologists early study legal profession. While there were initial 
research work in several particular features related to law firms (for 
instance, Ladinsky studies social conformation of private practice in 
Chicago
9; Smigel investigates recruitment techniques adopted by New York 
law firms
10; Wood performs case studies that shed light on ways of informal 
work present in criminal law practice, as examples
11), the contributions that 
guide actual bibliography on the way law firms operate mostly come from 
academics from Law itself (Law professors who describe specific facets of 
the practice), management, sociology with some contributions of 
                                                 
7 See Pérez Perdomo supra note 5 at 120. 
8 See Perez Perdomo supra note 5 at Ch. 4. 
9 See J. Ladinsky, Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice, and Legal Institutions, AMERICAN 
SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 28, 1963. 
10 See E. Smigel, The Impact of Recruitment on the Organization of the Large Law Firm, 
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 25, 1960. 
11 See A. L. Wood, Informal Relations in the Practice of Criminal Law, AMERICAN 6  Juan M.C. Larrosa [24-Feb-05 
economists.
12 
Job market is associated to enter in the state bureaucracy or being part 
of the private sector. Lawyers in the private sector appreciate their 
professional independence that use to be the main reason for “embracing the 
Law”. Partnership, on the other hand, serves for business office costs 
reduction and for offering a more diverse set of legal services; in more 
theoretical terms, partnership outlines a good practice in sectors that are 
intensive in human capital utilization because final product is difficult to 
observe.
13  
Into the private sector, lawyers can work as corporate employee in the 
legal department or as litigant lawyer. This last category will be focused by 
this survey. As litigant lawyer she can perform as independent lawyer (solo 
practice) or partner in different combinations (with one or more associates 
or partners, with or without employee, among other possibilities.) For 
instance, Sauer analyzes job mobility in law graduates from University of 
                                                                                                                            
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 62, 1956. 
12  Precisely in economic terms, performance in professional service sector becomes 
difficult to measure with standard procedures in comparison with another productive 
sectors because the complexity on determining what’s the final product. Kox studies the 
Dutch professional service sector, that includes legal services, and finds two factors that 
persist in the analysis: firms are mostly small and productivity (in terms of production) 
remain stagnated for years. Market has a high entrance of incumbents and high quitting rate 
of small players. In general, he founds an economic sector composed by many and small 
firms that maintain levels of work relatively similar year after year and they manage to 
survive with that. See H. Kox, Impact of monopolistic competition on productivity and 
industry structure in business services, Working paper III/2000-8 (Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Research), Netherlands, 2000. 
13 See J. Levin and S. Tadelis, Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships, 
Stanford University, working paper, 2001. 24-Feb-05]   CONNECTIONS, SPECIALIZATION, & LAWSUITS  7 
Michigan.
14 Working with a database he tries to identify lawyers’ job 
choices classified in common professional choices (independent practice, 
non-profit organizations, elite law firms, non-elite law firms, and intern in a 
firm.) Calibration shows that through job life these lawyers has a low 
probability to enter elite law firms though elite law firm experience is a key 
for entering to any other market sector under analysis. Reputation and 
acquired experience crucially help for this. Such inter-firm human capital 
transference depends on the economic possibilities of each firm itself for 
attracting this highly qualified labor force. However, non-profit 
organizations offer lower salaries than firms or solo practice but this option 
offers higher non-pecuniary profits, for example, a greater probability of 
being offered positions in a non-elite law firm (small law firms). 
Heinz & Laumann already observed the sensitive change in American 
law firms upon the client-based approach:
15 client-type preeminence shaped 
firm’s organizational form. They detected two hemispheres: in one hand, 
big law firms composed by elite university graduates focused in serving 
corporate clients and, in the other hand, those firms composed by non-elite 
university graduates dedicated to individual client serving. The first ones 
were correlated with high office buildings and the up-or-out system, which 
                                                 
14 See R.M. Sauer, Job Mobility and the Market for Lawyers, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 106, 1998. 
15 See J.P. HEINZ & E.O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
BAR, (Northwestern University Press, 1982). 8  Juan M.C. Larrosa [24-Feb-05 
will be summarized in the next section, while the second ones were 
associated with small law firm dynamics. Sensitive changes have taken 
place in big law firms. These transformations had been originated in USA in 
the early 20
th century. All the same, professional life seems to show relative 
similar dynamics in small law firms whether in developed
16 or 
undeveloped
17 countries.  
A common job option in USA that is not that common in the rest of the 
World is to enter in a big law firm. Why big law firm’ organizational 
structure has not be spread out across the World? One explanation could be 
that circumstances that generate American big law expansion are not jointly 
present outside USA. For instance, Brock and colleagues enumerate these 
change forces as:
18  
(i) Deregulation: Institutional authorization granted by bar 
associations for commercial advertising and free inter-jurisdictional 
operations both allowing law firms competition, among others.  
(ii) Competence: Due to the growing number of graduates and the 
imitative process of competing firms’ generation. 
(iii) Technology: Digitalization of judicial work allows for non-
                                                 
16 See C. Seron (1996), THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW, (Temple University Press, 
1996). 
17 See F. FUCITO, EL PERFIL DEL ABOGADO DE LA PROVINCIA DE BUENOS AIRES. 
INVESTIGACIÓN CUALITATIVA. (Colegio de Abogados de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 
1996) (in Spanish) and PÉREZ PERDONO supra note 5 at 131-134. 
18 See D.M. Brock, M.J. Powell & C.R. Hinings, The Changing Professional Organization: 
Towards New Archetypes and Typology, Academy of Management, Organization 24-Feb-05]   CONNECTIONS, SPECIALIZATION, & LAWSUITS  9 
professional or paralegal personnel to do the job. 
(iv) Globalization: Expansion of supply to external markets. 
There are other dimensions that differentiate one organizational form 
from the other. For instance, association goal among big law firms’ 
members is profit sharing while in small law firms is usually office-
maintenance-cost sharing. That creates incentives for small law firms not to 
expand too much, because monitoring problems could arise. In big law 
firms, on the other hand, profit-sharing foundation goal makes firm growth 
always an option for recruiting potential associates and partners where more 
profits could be obtained and shared.  
Another dimension to be taken upon account is client property. De la 
Maza makes the point that in American big law firms, clients belong to the 
firm, not to the specific lawyer (junior, associate, or partner) that serves 
them.
19 That creates incentives for law firm’s members to remain in the firm 
given the low probability of taken clients with her if she decides to leave the 
firm and begins solo practice. In small law firms, especially in Latin 
America and other countries that found their legal system in the Continental 
Civil Right, clients belong to the particular lawyer that attends them. So the 
incentives are that once a big clients portfolio is created, lawyers leave the 
firm and opens her owns by taking clients with her. Following with some 
                                                                                                                            
Management & Theory Division, Toronto, Canada, mimeo, 2001. 
19 See I. De la Maza, Lawyers: From the State to the Markets, Stanford University Law 10  Juan M.C. Larrosa [24-Feb-05 
aspects of the Latin American case, big industrial firms in Latin America 
often have enormous legal departments (the case of Venezuela’s main oil 
company –PDVSA– is investigated by Gómez
20) so they don’t usually 
require external legal advice. Another possible cause of the lack of presence 
of big law firms outside USA could be that in the case of countries that base 
their legal system on the Continental Civil Right tend to a have lesser 
quantity of lawyers, in general, and less lawyers in the private practice, in 
particular, compared with those based on Anglo-Saxon Common Law. In 
the same manner, these last ones have shown a trend in deregulation private 
practice through institutional authorization of inter-jurisdictional practice 
and professional advertising.
21  
Independents lawyers or small partnership lawyers are prone to survive 
in a more informal framework. They just work with clients as they arrive 
and, depending on market size, they decide whether to specialize or to 
remain as generalist. Practitioners’ economic and social backgrounds are 
also more diverse. Although it remains as an independent job it is also true 
that is subject to variable earnings.   
Small law firm practitioners and Law professors sustain a more 
conservative opinion on what Law practice means, distanced away from any 
                                                                                                                            
School, master thesis, 2001. 
20 See M. Gómez, Los abogados de negocios en Venezuela, Stanford University Law 
School, mimeo (in Spanish), 2002. 
21 See W.H. Starbuck, The Success Secrets of the Best American Lawyers or How to Keep 
an Elephant and a Butterfly in a House of Cards, JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 30, 24-Feb-05]   CONNECTIONS, SPECIALIZATION, & LAWSUITS  11 
business-like view of it, and they often have posted ethical statements.
22 Big 
law firm’ practitioners appeal with pragmatism: society and business 
evolution have made necessary and profitable big law firms emergence.  
The asymmetric scenery has been sketched: on one hand, few giant 
actors (big law firms), and in the other hand thousands of little actors (most 
of the rest of private practice), just like the elephant and the butterfly 
playing in a house of cards mentioned by Starbuck.
23 This asymmetric trend 
is expected even more demarked in the future.
24  
Next we will review literature on human capital and performance.  
 
3. HUMAN CAPITAL AND PERFORMANCE 
Human capital theory sustains that knowledge provides individuals with 
increasing cognitive skills that conveys in potentially more efficient and 
productive activities.
25 Academic literature has shown through several 
papers the positive relationship between human capital variables and firm 
performance.
26  
Firm looks always for better human capital levels. Increasing human 
                                                                                                                            
1993. 
22 This discussion is well described in SERON supra note 12 at Ch. 1. 
23 See STARBUCK supra note 21. 
24 See H.W. Arthurs & R. Kreklewich, Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in 
the New Economy, OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 34, 1996 at 44. 
25 See G.S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (University of Chicago Press, 1964) and see also T. 
Schultz, Investment in man: an economist’s view, SOCIAL SERVICES REVIEW 33, 1959. 
26 For a comprehensive survey on this specific subject see A. Teixeira, On the Link Between 
Human Capital and Firm Performance: A Theoretical and Empirical Survey, WORKING 
PAPER No. 121, FACULDADE DE ECONOMÍA, UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO (Portugal), 2002. 12  Juan M.C. Larrosa [24-Feb-05 
capital implies increasing labor productivity. However, ways for increasing 
this kind capital are numerous. Individual capital grows up by acquiring 
knowledge tacitly or explicitly. Education and experience years are the 
variables more usually applied to approach this latent dimension. We learn 
tacitly by doing a task repeatedly (learning by doing) and explicitly by 
accessing to such knowledge by external sources (training, formal 
education). Under this last case, external sources could take several forms 
for lawyers: mentorship (through tutors that accompany juniors’ career 
development process), postgraduate programs (masters, PhD), updating 
courses and seminars (in specific law branches), and the like. 
As remarked in Section 2, we must distinguish to highly different labor 
worlds: Big law firms, on one side, and the rest of the private practice, on 
the other. Following section initiates the description of contributions that 
show how human capital is generated in big law firms. 
 
A.   Human Capitalists & Cravath’s Mechanism  
For those who enter to big law firms as potential associates, literature 
reveals an extremely time and personal demanding professional improving 
process. Several articles detailed this human capital formation internal 
dynamics.
27 Common observed patterns are: 
                                                 
27 See R.J. Gilson & R.H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: The 
Economics of Associate Career Patterns. STANFORD LAW REVIEW 41, 1989; M.S. 24-Feb-05]   CONNECTIONS, SPECIALIZATION, & LAWSUITS  13 
(i) Firms hire young professionals on career background (university 
of graduation, GPA, job attitude and legal potential, among others). 
In the case of Canadian firms they use to sign apprenticeship 
contracts for young graduates even before they even pass the bar 
exam.
28  
(ii) Young graduates get into the firm for a fixed time period as 
junior lawyer (usually, 1 or 2 years contract.) During this period 
begins the internal competence called tournament that allow these 
young apprentices to show their potentiality by assisting in associate 
and partner lawyers’ work. This stage helps senior lawyers to 
identify future associates. 
(iii) Passed this first period, a group of entrants is selected by the 
firm board on grounds of effectiveness on the job and they are 
offered the position of associates. People from non-selected group 
have to quit and look for another job somewhere else. This process 
is usually called the  “up-or-out” system.  
(iv) For the newer associates now begin the race for becoming 
partner of the firm. Firm board expects associates to dedicate all of 
their time to the issues of the firm’s client. Associates earn a fixed 
                                                                                                                            
GALANTER & T.M. PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG 
LAW FIRM (University of Chicago Press, 1991), and F.W. Lambert, Business Lawyering 
and Value Creation for Clients, OREGON LAW REVIEW 74, 1995. 
28 See F.M. Kay, Flight from Law: A Competing Risks Model of Departures from Law 
Firms, LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 31, 1997, at 328. 14  Juan M.C. Larrosa [24-Feb-05 
wage while partners share profits usually according to seniority. 
This unchains another assessment period (in average of 5 to 8 years, 
depending on the firm.) At the end of this period, the board again 
assess the merits of each associated in terms of hours billed, clients 
brought to the firm, level of prestige in the local legal community, 
among others (due to the level of competition observed this stage it 
is usually named in the literature as rat races). Up-or-out system is 
applied here for the second time. 
Historically the law firm Cravath, a today’s American big law firm, was 
the first in implementing this system so it’s usually called the Cravath 
system.
29 It has been detected three main internal groups that conforms this 
human capital formation process.
30 These are: the finders or associates, 
whose job if to find new clients and sustain the existing ones, the 
supervisors or manager partners, who organize operations, schedule 
deadlines, determine compensation policies and promote training programs 
and, finally, the grinders or young professionals whose job is to accomplish 
most of the routine work. This permanent recruitment dynamics allow that 
the law firm could handle on average more cases per partner and associate. 
That is, young grinders are assigned for most of the routine job with the 
                                                 
29 See P. Tolbert & R. Stern, Organizations of Professionals: Governance Structures in 
Large Law Firms, in P. TOLBERT & S. BARLEY (EDS.), RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
ORGANIZATIONS, Vol. 8 (JAI Press, 1991). 
30 See Y. Kor, Generating and Sustaining Rents in Professional Service Firms Through 
Firm-specific Human Capital, PROCEEDINGS OF THE MIDWEST ACADEMY OF 24-Feb-05]   CONNECTIONS, SPECIALIZATION, & LAWSUITS  15 
goal of helping and sustaining partners and associates’ efforts. This 
facilitates that one associate or partner alone could manage more cases that 
what she could handle by herself. The procedure is called human capital 
leverage because it acts like a low fixed cost (apprentices’ wage) that levers 
greater and variable income (hours billed for associates and partners). This 
process drives for the attainment of finest human capital quality.
31 As 
Galanter & Palay remark, this organizational structure enables to transfer 
human capital from those who have more (senior partner and associates) to 
those who have less (junior lawyers and newer associates).
32 Work in big 
law firms, as seen, requires to be highly specialized in specific tasks and 
law branches. 
A more controlled and less competitive way of transferring human 
capital is by using mentors. Mentorship becomes key in specifics human 
capital transfers. In big law firms, mentors are chosen among the senior 
partners (usually just before they retire). They have developed an eye for 
recognizing people with high professional potential, so they are in charge of 
guiding and advising these recruits for they to catch its professional 
maturity as soon as feasible. Mentorship smoothes the ruthless process of 
human capital transfer framed into the big law firm internal tournament. 
                                                                                                                            
MANAGEMENT, 1999. 
31 See T.J. Morris & A.H. Pinnington, Beyond the ‘War for Talent’ Hype: Capacity 
Constraints and Archetype Change in Professional Firms, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIAN-
PACIFIC RESEARCHERS IN ORGANIZATION STUDIES at 5. 
32 See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 5. 16  Juan M.C. Larrosa [24-Feb-05 
Likewise it gives to who receives the mentorship more emotional restraint 
and allows for higher intellectual security in a focused and ordered human 
capital transfer. Mentorship in women professional career could be seen 
through Wallace.
33 She finds that women with male tutors were associated 
to higher income but those with female tutors found more career 
satisfaction, they were also more motivated to continue in the profession 
and exhibited less labor pressure (about this last issue, Kay finds similar 
results.)
 34  
This organizational structure has remarkably showed its efficiency 
along the firms who adopted it. Between 1975 and 1985, big law firms in 
United States grew up at a rate of 8 per cent annually.
35 Between 1968 and 
1987, average size of the top twenty big law firms increased four times. 
Between 1975 and 1987, mean and median firm size increased almost three 
times among the top 200 law firms (from a mean of 82 and a median of 68 
in 1975 to a mean of 233 and a median of 205 in 1987). As long as big law 
firms’ growth rates accelerated the same growth rate was observed in their 
total legal services market share. This has constrained small and solo 
practices because they are many more and they have to share a decreasing 
                                                 
33 See J. Wallace, The Benefits of Mentoring for Female Lawyers, JOURNAL OF 
VOCATIONAL BEHAVIOR 58, 1991. 
34 See F.M. Kay, Balancing Acts: Career and Family among Lawyers, in S. BOYD (ED.), 
CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW & PUBLIC POLICY (University 
of Toronto Press, 1997). 
35 See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 5 at 46. 24-Feb-05]   CONNECTIONS, SPECIALIZATION, & LAWSUITS  17 
market share.
36 
Big law firm’s exponential growth has several explanations. Galanter & 
Palay summarize that growth rate depends on:  
(i) Ratio of associate/partner,  
(ii) Percentage of associate promoted to partners,  
(iii) Period of time between an associated get into the firm and is 
promoted to partner, and  
(iv) Number of partners that leave the firm.  
Any of these variables are feasible of modification by the firm board, 
though central question is to fix (i) to a wished level and then adjust the rest 
of the indicators to keep constant such ratio.
37 
In the same manner, the up-or-out schema is modeled with economic 
theory under a system of recursive contracts by Bardsley & Sherstyuk.
38 
Their conclusions, while preliminary, are extremely interesting given the 
empirical evidence and justifications that will be noted later. In this model, 
agents are asked to choose their effort level given a wage structure. Under 
adverse selection conditions, future wage contracts are offered on equal 
                                                 
36 See E. Michelson, E.O. Laumann & J.P Heinz (2000), The Changing Character of the 
Lawyer-Client Relationship. Evidence from Two Chicago Surveys. In J. WEESIE & W. RAUB 
(EDS.), THE MANAGEMENT OF DURABLE RELATIONS: THEORETICAL MODELS AND 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF HOUSEHOLDS AND ORGANIZATIONS, (ThelaThesis, 2000). 
37 See M.S. GALANTER & T.M. PALAY, Large Law Firm Misery: It’s the Tournament, Not 
the Money, VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 52, 1999 at 964. 
38 See P. Bardsley & K. Sherstyuk, Rat Races and Glass Ceilings: An Analysis of Career 
Path in Organizations, Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, mimeo, 
Australia, 2002. 18  Juan M.C. Larrosa [24-Feb-05 
rights basis for all applicants
39 respecting labor regulations or current social 
conventions. They found that given the promotions incentives schema, the 
equilibrium outcome was work hard (‘rat races’) and an unequal promotion 
rate (‘glass ceiling’). This outcome has nothing to do with an internal 
discriminatory policy but with the different initial conditions of the 
applicants. Women tend to have a higher exit value than men because they 
value more to form a family and raise children, so incentives force them to 
quit the rat race sooner than men.
40  
It is equally noted that excess in human capital leverage could show 
adverse effects in firm’s profitability.
41 This way, it would be hard to find 
new partners because it would be low the probability for associates to 
ascend. This would also diminish the work motivation for current 
employees that ultimately affect the quality of the service. Lastly, this risk 
would make firms to offer higher wages for attracting new associates, 
which redound in lower benefits to share. Another problem it is observed 
                                                 
39 Authors made clear that actually women have higher payment for quitting the job than 
men because it is valuable to form and raise a family. In the other hand, minority members 
could also have disadvantages on educational background. That contradicts the contract on 
equal rights basis.  
40 This incentive framework has been assessed under experimental conditions. See H. 
Oesterbeek, R. Sloof & J. Sonnemans, Promotion rules and skill acquisitions: An 
experimental study, Working paper No. 19-01, Department of Economics, University of 
Amsterdam, 2001. They find evidence that this system is better supported when there exists 
reciprocity and trust among the participants. Without these features present, it is usually 
observed that employees over-invest in their training because they mistrust that the 
promotion will be granted (again, rat races with glass ceiling) 
41 See M.A. Hitt, L. Bierman, K. Shimizu, & R. Kochhar, Direct and Moderating Effects of 
Human Capital on Strategy and Performance in Professional Service Firms: A Resource-
based Perspective, ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 44, 2001. 24-Feb-05]   CONNECTIONS, SPECIALIZATION, & LAWSUITS  19 
when two or more firms merge.
42 Merging tend to deeply affect internal 
labor markets by shocking the promotions scheme and leading to dismiss of 
high human capital personnel. In the same way, this process influences the 
level of identification of the actors towards the new firm that could affect 
their productivity level as well. 
However, Cravath system has been adapted to a whirling market. Three 
contributions
43 describe recent changes in this selection process associated 
with dealing with an increasing numbers of lawyers in the labor market. 
This way, competition conditions have been reformulated for big law firms 
lawyers: now it is been admitted to dismiss partners (once an untouched 
issues until the professional retire) through lateral hiring (it means to 
supplant him/her with an equal hierarchy and seniority partner from another 
law firm
44), temporary contracts for lawyers to attend an specific case, 
creation of counselor lawyer, modifications to profit sharing rules (‘eat-
what-you-kill’ rule displaces seniority-based sharing rule), among others. 
Many of these changes tried to make more flexible the rigid promotion 
structure with the ultimate goal of facilitating the emergence of 
entrepreneurs in the organization that adapt or change to specific 
                                                 
42 See L.H. Rohrer, The Effect of Mergers on Human Capital in Professional Service Firms, 
Harvard Business School, mimeo, 2004. 
43 See HEINZ supra note 4; E. Michelson, E.O. Laumann & J.P Heinz supra note 13 and J.P. 
Heinz, E.O. Laumann & E. Michelson, Chicago Lawyers and their Clients, 1975-95: A 
Client-Based Approach to the Social Transformation of the Bar, Proceedings of The 
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environments or tasks.
45 Another well-documented feature is the raise of 
paralegal employment hiring.
46 At last, the organizational efficiency of 
these firms makes them bearers of a highly desirable know-how, hardly 
duplicable in another markets. Many firms opt, that way, for 
internationalizing its portfolio by opening branches overseas.
47  
The success of this human capital promotion scheme, on the other side, 
has lead to another kind of service firms’ adoption, for example, financial
48 
and management services consultants.
49 Academic environment has also 
subtly adopted some lessons and the “up-or-out” has been translated into 
“publish-or-perish”. This Darwinian dynamics selection process can end up 
exhausting many well-prepared lawyers but less enthusiastic for such an 
intense competition (this case is mentioned in the legal literature as the 
lawyers’ misery
50) that they prefer to quit big-law firms. These 
circumstances that are observed as excesses in the profession also generate 
rejections. Ethical considerations are usually evoked as main concerns
51. 
                                                                                                                            
44 See KOR, op.cit. at 13. 
45 See Morris & Pinnington, op. cit., at 15. 
46 For an empirical analysis of this issue see R.M. Feinberg, Paralegal and Associate 
Lawyers: Substitutability within the Law Firm, 1977-1987, THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS 
AND STATISTICS 76 1994. 
47 For instance, a description of the expansion of Australian law firms in Asia could be seen 
in N. Malhotra, A. Pinnington & J. Gray, The distinctive features of Australian law firm 
internationalisation, Proceedings of Asian-Pacific Researchers in Organization Studies 
Annual Conference, Sidney, Australia, 2000. 
48 See A.V. Bhidé, Building the Professional Firm: McKinsey & Co.: 1939-1968, Harvard 
Business School, lecture notes, 1995. 
49 See J.A. Christiansen, Management Consulting Organizations, Working Paper 97/01/SM, 
INSEAD, France, 1997. 
50 See K. Hull, Cross-Examining the Myth of Lawyers’ Misery, VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 
54, 1999, and Galanter & Palay supra note 15. 
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Some authors argue that under this organizational scheme, profession only 
defends corporative interests, because only big corporations can pay such 
expensive bills. 
52,53 
Next, we are going to survey human capital on small law firms.  
 
B.   On Boutiques & Butterflies 
For those who practice law in an independent private way or in minor 
partnerships
54 human capital acquisition process seems simpler and more 
outcome-oriented. That’s because whatever investment in human capital 
small law firms do, they still rely on a more disperse and with a relative 
lower economic power demand than big law firm clients.  
Small law firm lawyers can improve their human capital by acquiring 
                                                                                                                            
literature (for instance, see P.J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of 
an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 52, 1999, 
and M.J. Kelly, Thinking about the Business of Practicing Law, VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 
52, 2001). Professional ethics and deep professional orientation on profit are main concerns 
for institutional proposals like PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROFESSIONS, NEW YORK BAR ASSOCIATION, 2000. 
52 See R. Nelson, PARTNERS WITH POWER, (University of California Press, 1988). 
53 On fees determination, a group of researchers studies how bills are determined by 
American lawyers trying to verify if institutional restrictions, like state bars admission 
examinations, affect these processes. See D. Lueck, R. Olsen & M. Ransom, Market and 
Regulatory Forces in the Pricing of Legal Services, JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS 
7, 1995. They conclude negatively on this behalf but they actually find that market forces 
affect fees (market size, economic activity level, number of other professional in the 
market, among others). Following price determination in legal markets, another 
contribution studies the legal services market in Scotland, trying to verify if bills are 
affected by advertising after this restriction was removed by 1985. See F.H. Stephen, 
Advertising, consumer search costs and prices in a professional service market, APPLIED 
ECONOMICS 26, 1994. Results show that only informative advertising (meaning that 
advertising focused only in the services provided by the professional, on the contrary of 
persuasive advertising that focus on encouraging clients for asking the service) has 
statistical influence on determining professional’s bills. In this case, a higher level of 
market advertising will enforce smaller bills being fixed by professionals because the 
presence of higher consumer information levels would enhance firm competition. 
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specific knowledge that help to differentiate from another lawyers through 
practice specialization or through particular training or academic programs, 
while none of these are excludable. In the first case, practice specialization, 
is based on the professional experience in a particular law branch, after a 
career choice has been made, resulting in a long run process because it takes 
many litigations for accessing the differential knowledge that accrues 
differential profits. Outcomes usually are observed in the maturity of the 
professional. The second case is a rather short run one, because it consists in 
the attendance to postgraduate courses or specialization programs. Lawyer 
accesses to explicit knowledge though that’s not guaranteed the transfer of 
the versatile tacit knowledge of the experience. However, it is feasible that 
obtaining postgraduate degrees make more profitable to recover her 
investment in a more immediate way, so entering to as intern in a firm 
becomes a highly inviting choice.  
Most common organizational form adopted is by far partnership among 
peers, which usually include friends and relatives.
55 Good relationships 
among partners are prone to solidification by friendship and familiar ties. 
Partnership allows developing a career without pressures, independently 
and pooling kinship and friendship ties with daily work. Office is 
informally administrated, with scarce management control, without written 
                                                                                                                            
big law firm. 
55 See SERON supra note 12 at Ch.5 24-Feb-05]   CONNECTIONS, SPECIALIZATION, & LAWSUITS  23 
performance assessments and with a face-to-face approach. Because of the 
low quantity of actors, there is no strict tracing of who’s going to be 
promoted and who won’t. Here, human capital leverage its given by 
secretaries, who usually take dictates, sort the written material or go to 
Court for dealing with lower importance paperwork.
56 Similarly, the 
increasing presence of unemployed junior professionals makes them ideal 
candidates for replacing these workers. 
Finally, solo practice represents the top of labor independence: one is 
her own boss. Advantages are resumed in: free choice of clients, own 
schedule, and fully business rents appropriation among others. Clear 
disadvantages are the lack of support during bad economic periods and 
pressures and rushes of time and money for office maintenance. 
The case of small and medium law firms there’s evidence of 
intergenerational transfer of rules and routines with a high dependence of 
the firm founders.
57 Similarly, there’s also evidence that medium status
58 
law firms are reluctant to innovate because of the risk of affecting their 
well-known image and social position.
59 They prefer to keep the status quo. 
                                                 
56 See SERON supra note 12 at 147. 
57 See D.J. Phillips, A Genealogical Approach to Organizational Life Chances: The Parent-
Progeny Transfer and Silicon Valley Law Firms, 1946-1996, ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE 
QUARTERLY 47, 2002. 
58 See J.M. Podolny, A Status-based Model of Market Competition, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
SOCIOLOGY 98, 1993. 
59 See D.J. Phillips & E.W. Zuckerman, Middle-Status Conformity: Theoretical Restatement 
and Empirical Demonstration in Two Markets, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 107, 
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Such innovation risk provokes that only followers adopt changes
60. This 
mimic scheme on business behavior pattern adoption is also observed in 
other liberal professions like the accountancy firms.
61  
The trade off between becoming specialist in one specific law branch or 
to practice as generalist in American law firms was studied by Jaffe.
62 
Though he focus on medium and big law firms, ratios used can generalized 
these results to small firms also. Alternatives proposed are to remain small 
and become specialist by offering custom service through which market 
size is lopped but bills are higher or remaining open to wider market but 
with lower bills charged. The author finds that more specialist firms tend to 
be smaller in terms of number of professionals hired but, in the other side, 
they growth faster than generalist firms. Business is, when there is higher 
competence, to differentiate the product (by offering a handcrafted and 
tailor-made service) and to charge higher bills. These organizational forms 
are called boutique firms in USA and Canada. A good description of this 
organizational choice can be found in the Bar report on the future of the 
                                                 
60 Which coincides with findings on the services sector stagnant productivity. See H. Kox, 
Impact of monopolistic competition on productivity and industry structure in business 
services, Working paper III/2000-8, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Research, 
Netherlands, 2000. 
61 See K. Lee & J.M. Pennings, Mimicry and the Market: Adoption of a New 
Organizational Form, ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, Special Research Forum on 
Institutional Theory, 2000. 
62 See J. Jaffe, Resource-Partitioning Dynamics and Generalist and Specialist Firm 
Growth: Evidence from the Austin and Silicon Valley Corporate Legal Markets, 
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legal profession in Quebec
63, which suggest it to its members as a profitable 
alternative in a market with high mountains (small big law firms) and wider 
plains (numerous small law firms). Boutique firm emerges as a small firm 
with hour bills similar to big law firms ones. Precisely, Garicano & 
Hubbard use an enormous classified database from the Bureau of Census 
for estimating competence fields in all kind of American law firms.
64 This 
way they want to profile the sector degree of specialization. They find two 
main facts: (i) Following Jaffe findings
65, firms tend to specialize when 
market size increases, in behalf of differentiate from relatively homogenous 
competence, and (ii) Lawyers tend to work with same specialty peers, 
avoiding peers from another law branches. Coincidently with these findings, 
Fucito finds that in small and medium cities there is not economic scale for 
specialization development in any specific law branch.
66 Most solo 
professionals and small firms adopt a generalist position in law practice 
accepting almost any case for ‘staying in the business’.
67 Finally, Kay find 
that solo practice is one the exits from lawyer’s misery.
68 Many 
professionals with a strong organizational commitment see this choice a 
smooth transition from the big law firm jungle. Maybe this represents the 
                                                 
63 See BARREAU DU QUEBEC, LA PRATIQUE DE DROIT AU QUEBEC ET L’AVENIR DE LA 
PROFESSION, Canada, 1996, (in French) at 117.  
64 See L. Garicano & T.N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of 
Labor Within and Between Law Firms, Working Paper 9719, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2003. 
65 See JAFFE supra note 40 
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most original organizational scheme in the profession: total independence, 
free schedule choice, and practice flexibility.  
In the following section we follow with the other capital dimension 
under survey:  social capital. 
 
4. SOCIAL CAPITAL AS AN ASSET FOR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT 
Several definitions still prevail in social capital literature. First, 
Bourdieu defines social capital social as actual or potential resources related 
to the possession of a durable network of relations more or less 
institutionalized of mutual friendship and reconnaissance
69. Initial studies 
on social networks looked for detecting mutual relationships group in 
communities that helps to create cooperative behaviors among its 
integrants. Bourdieu suggests, on the other side, that every kind of capital 
could be derived from economic capital. A firm can invest economic capital 
in activities that conveys to the production of social capital. Corporate 
philanthropy is a clear example of this. By donating economic capital to 
social causes a firm can facilitate the development of social networks. 
Economic capital, in this process, is converted in social capital through time 
and other resources (money) investment.  
                                                                                                                            
67 See SERON supra note 12 at 169. 
68 See KAY supra note 6. 
69 See P. Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, In J.G. RICHARDSON (ED.), HANDBOOK OF 
THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, (Greenwood Press, 1986) at 
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On the other side, a first empirical approach belongs to Professor 
Granovetter. His investigation tries to cope the job finding procedures of a 
sample of Boston University graduates.
70 Results revealed that most 
interviewed found their job thru information provided by light connected 
people, e.g. people they barely know. Granovetter concludes that in reality 
people widely and wisely use their loosely tied resources.  
Professor Coleman, on the other hand, looks for a connection between 
social and human capital, specifically how social capital helps in the human 
capital process formation.
71 He postulates that the degree of network 
closure is what defines the value of social capital; e.g., the closer the 
extreme nodes are, the greater the acknowledgment and emotional support 
the individual and the group would get. It also facilitates the punishment 
towards those who apart from group’s norms and costumes.  
A definition that refines Granovetter’s is that of Professor Burt
72, who 
sees cohesive structures as a sign of rigidity when used for managing a 
complex organization. He advocates for defining network-created-social 
capital as that composed for the larger quantity of contacts without nodes of 
non-redundant information (structural holes). Burt shows how firms obtain 
                                                 
70 See M. Granovetter, The strength of weak ties, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 78, 
1973. 
71 See J.S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF SOCIOLOGY 94, 1988. 
72 See R. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES, (Harvard University Press, 1992) and R. Burt, The 
Contingent Value of Social Capital, ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY 42, 1997, at 
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competitive advantages for connecting non-redundant nodes. Namely, an 
actor tied to a highly dense set of connections (with constant, routine, and 
highly emotive bilateral interactions) makes that the actor access constantly 
to redundant information flow, e.g. information already accessed that wont 
bring any potential advantage to be exploited for better performance. In this 
sense, it is assumed given that to keep a relationship costs equally, in time 
and dedication, it is convenient to obtain it the best and most diverse 
available sources of information. For instance, if any agent relates to friends 
that are, at the same time, friends to each other, then the information of only 
one of them becomes the original information. The rest only will repeat the 
first’s argument. Burt, at the end, upholds that social capital refers to degree 
of diverse sources of valuable information (non redundant) that is accessed 
by the individual or the organization.  
Professor Lin from Northwestern University, on the other hand, defines 
social capital as an investment in social relationships with expected 
returns.
73 This definition is more general. No matter the strength or 
closeness in relationships structure: individuals dedicate to establish 
connections and networks for making profit. For this, Lin considers four 
explanations on how resources embedded in a social network can bring 
valuable outcomes for the organization: 
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a) Information: The previous argument applies here. In imperfect 
competition situations certain social links strategically placed in 
network give better information in terms of opportunities and choice 
not available under other circumstances. 
b) Influence: These relationships can exert influence in other agents 
(for instance, local authorities), which can play critical roles in 
decisions (to ask for legal services, for example) that involve the 
actor.  
c) Social credentials: Network embeddedness and its 
acknowledgment by third parties can be considered by agents or 
organization as social credentials that the individual can access to 
certain resources thru its social network. 
d) Reinforcement: It is expected that social networks reinforce 
identity and recognition. To be a member of a social network gives 
recognition to individual labor made inside it as long as it gives 
identity through individual appraisement and emotional support.  
Coleman-Burt discussion is often resumed in the trade off: deepen 
existing social relationships using a strong tie approach (bonding) or 
brokering information among disconnected points by keeping weak ties 
(bridging). Professor Lin pragmatically establishes that network matters 
according to the embedded resources available in it and the degree of access 
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the individual has. By that, whether more embedded resources are present in 
the network, the more we should try to connect to this network. Probably 
real social capital emerges from some intermediate point, in which the 
individual deepen her links in the social framework where she performs 
and, when it is possible, she exploits information brokerage opportunities 
for reaching more valuable resources.
74  
Note that Burt focus in information obtained because of a network 
structure while Coleman’s approach settles on how a structure facilitates 
norms creation and enforcement. Both approaches are consistent with their 
underlying assumptions. The two focusing coincide in that it is positive to 
be a member of larger social networks. However, optimal structures defer. 
The network that serves us to access to information could not be a good 
structure for collective action promotion or emotional support.
75   
All the same, not only network size is important but also the diversity of 
resources lying in it. Hence, it is necessary to access to a big network 
composed by diverse categories of individuals. That’s usually applies for 
structure with a preeminence of Granovetter’s weak ties and Burt’s 
structural holes. 
Finally, Lin clearly distinguishes the difference between resource access 
                                                 
74 In any case, the lack of a large social network always becomes a disadvantage especially 
in the case of ethnic minorities. See M.C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology 
of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 67, 1998 at 837-862. 
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and effective use of them.
76 Social capital can be understood in economic 
terms as the present expected value of the resources available for access and 
use for satisfying individual utility through her social links. Present value 
remits to alters-possessed-resources that, in case of necessity or just by 
requirement, can be accessible to an ego. Such value must be understood as 
potential as long as ego does not use the resources available for access in 
present time. At the end, individuals establish different types of 
relationships (friendship, camaraderie, superficial knowledge) with other 
peers for being able to use resources (money, property use, influence, 
information, advice) from such individuals when they require that way. A 
distinction that will be made later refers to the relative place where 
individuals form potentially profitable links. This way, inside the firm’s 
organization people will look for connecting another people that enable a 
more successful career; we will define this as intra-organizational social 
capital. At the same time, the firm or the people themselves will also look in 
the market for profitable links and we will call this as inter-organizational 
social capital. 
We follow surveying theoretical and empirical contributions that relate 
this capital dimension with agents’ performance.  
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A.   Social Capital as an Asset 
Granovetter’s work on the influence of occasional personal contacts on 
job matching chances could be the most quoted on the relationship between 
individual performance and social capital. Mortensen & Vishwanath find 
again empirical evidence that retorts these findings.
77 
By avoiding relationships scheme that constraint actors’ action has been 
a constant in many social sciences branches, especially Economics. In 
another article, Granovetter argue that the absence of social context in 
economic analysis acting as a constraint in firm behavior was a crucial part 
of the real economics complexity puzzle.
78 Atomistic analysis would simply 
going to understand all of these effects in agent decision-making process.  
However economic agents do not apparently see these relationships as 
limitations. Because of that, relationship between agent’s performance and 
social capital has been demonstrated in several studies. Professor Bian 
studies 188 commercial firms in the Chinese province of Guangzhou.
79 He 
finds that the social connections degree between firms’ managers and 
government authorities bestows firms a differential performance. Peng & 
Luo confirm this evidence while being more robust on their findings on the 
                                                 
77 See D.T. Mortensen & T. Vishwanath, Personal contacts and earnings: It is who you 
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importance of social capital on performance.
80 Although the case of China 
has particularities especially studied by scholars
81, evidence signals directly 
to a positive relationship between connections and performance.   
Fafchamps & Minten find that agriculture merchants in Magadascar that 
have more economic success are those related to a higher degree of prestige 
obtained by past long lasting trust ties among customers and peers.
82 
Aldrich & Davis study American small and medium size firms checking if 
managers’ participation in voluntary associations bestows them some 
differential advantage.
83 Results show that the participation in these non-
profit organizations allows them to access to different resources, like 
professional advice, small credit granting, resources that in other case 
would be expensive or harder to obtain. In this case there’s no evidence of 
genre disadvantage maybe because, as authors suggest, the sample only 
include business proprietors.  
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Not just in reality but also in controlled environments interaction 
benefits emerge. Jones makes experiments with subjects that simulated 
firms operating several departments (marketing, accounting, sales, and the 
like) in a virtual market.
84 Game rounds make participants to get related 
with other ‘firms’ according to every department requirement. Lastly, firms 
with higher degree of contacts show better performance in terms of 
monetary rewards.  
Likewise, and as suggested before, friendship network formation among 
competitors (peers in the same profession or industry) can bring beneficial 
outcomes for all the participants, by lowering competition levels and by 
creating norms that smooth business relationships in a competing market.
85 
At the end, social capital can and often includes our competitors. 
A recently empowered source of social capital is information 
technology, which helps to create or substitute social capital. Internet allows 
people to connect each other in a more flexible way. There it can be 
obtained information, friendship, casual chat and, more important, potential 
clients.
86 In the same manner, this form of connections creation do not 
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affect already possessed social capital.
87 Religion, as a cult that relates 
people in a periodical way under a same system of beliefs is also a 
structural source of social capital.
88 
However, social network formation and their utilization not only convey 
benefits. Gabbay & Leenders remind us that it could generate social 
liabilities too.
89 If the embedded resources are only ours (e.g., if we are 
connected to nodes without resources or they use our resources without 
reciprocity), then social embeddedness, under these circumstances, could 
rationally be avoided. Another demonstration that in restricted 
environments social capital could have negative effects it has been observed 
in totalitarian regimes. Völker & Flap show that the presence of potential 
government’s informers in the neighborhood stimulated citizen to 
drastically lower their social capital in the former Democratic Republic of 
Germany.
90 
As observed in section 2, law firms divide organizational forms whether 
they were big or small law firms. Following we survey literature on big law 
firms social capital. 
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B.  Support and connections at the high mountains 
Big law firms have an organization accordant to big cases they attend. 
They represent the economic and organizational summit of the legal 
profession. Studies on embedded resources utilization have two dimensions: 
(i) contributions with a clear intra-organizational approach focusing on the 
strong internal competence under hierarchical structures in big law firms, 
and (ii) contributions that describe the effects of market embeddedness on 
firm performance with an inter-organizational approach. In the first case, 
authors look for understanding how actors within big law firms make 
relationships among them procuring to ascend in the professional ladder and 
getting control of the firm. In the second case, the issue is how the firm 
through their members moves in the market network for locating in way 
that facilitate getting more conspicuous clients that pay higher bills.   
Intra-organizationally, interaction ways reach a complexity degree that 
deserves particular studies. Lazega
91 jointly with previous works
92 represent 
a unique core in social network research in law firms. Basically his 
contribution consists in detecting exchange niches created by associates and 
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partners of a big law firm in New England where information flows 
generating a stable environment for future exchange. Most wanted resources 
are access to loyal work partners, access to colleagues’ advice and 
friendship. However, all resources search is biased mainly towards the more 
prestigious lawyers. Everybody seems to love prestige. Anyway, the 
creation of these small social capital redoubts is positively correlated with 
the performance of the participants. Prevalent structure in these niches is 
triad, three partners and associates jointly working. As a negative outcome 
is often mentioned that this excessive cohesiveness conveys to professionals 
leave the firm taken their clients with them. On the other hand, as a 
collegiate entity, the firm usually has an awkward task in imposing to its 
members in productivity assessment. The hardest case use to be the 
correction of a partner with bad performance, for which it is subtle, required 
some lateral control (another partner follow him and suggest changes).   
Firm’s board sessions, on the other hand, are often influence by elder 
partners, whose prestige lied on multiple status (as a professional, as a 
litigant, as a client-getting person, among others).  Something similar is 
found by Kim who detects la presence of an endorsement effect in less 
prestigious lawyers’ social capital (usually because of youth) for whom the 
closeness to more prestigious lawyers (for joint works) make them to 
escalate stairs in the professional and social status ladder.
93 To work or to 
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serve more prestigious lawyers bestow them better perspectives in the 
internal job market, as suggested by Lin
94,
95. 
On the other hand, it is observed gender discrimination problems. Kay 
& Hagan study the Canadian case.
96 Even when women, during rat race, 
accumulate more social capital, thru making connections with big 
institutional clients that generates more profits to the law firm that is 
compensated with promotions in the same manner as their male 
counterparts. It prevails a glass ceiling for women in big law firms.
97 Kay 
develops a probabilistic model of leaving the profession for Canadian 
lawyers too.
98 The paper is rich in empirical results being their main 
findings the diversity of potential lawyers’ labor destinations. Lawyer 
results a high mobility career: professionals can work in a big law firm and 
then develop a solo career or join the government in any of the State powers 
or even leave the practice. Kay again confirms female discrimination: 
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women promote to partner 40 per cent more slowly than men and have 60 
per cent more chance of leaving law practice at all. Suggestively, small law 
firms have less success in retaining female peers in the profession than their 
big counterparts: big law firms members leave the firm for developing a 
solo career but small law firms members leave the firm for directly leaving 
the practice. We should remember Bardsley & Sherstyuk theoretical 
findings: It would no the internal competition fault but the labor contract 
that not weight differently to those who are intrinsically different in the rat 
race.
99 
Interaction between intra-organizational social capital and performance 
is very interesting. Kay & Hagan model promotion-to-partner 
probabilities.
100 They find that associates whose main responsibility is to 
bring new clients (the finders) have 50 per cent more chances of promotion 
compared to those who work with current law firm’s clients. In the same 
manner, in associates that are members of professional associations this 
probability increases in 13 per cent. Here, it is observed how law firms 
clearly reward activities that increase members’ social capital.  
Inter-organizationally, big law firms make use of their social 
embeddedness for price formation in legal services market. Uzzi & 
Lancaster show how big law firms use social networks for settling a 
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prestige image that enable for increasing their fees.
101 Services are analyzed 
as prestige or Veblian goods, e.g. demand increase as price increases.
102   
It is also interesting to understand why some links that are associated 
with economic performance could break up and what are the features 
associated with this event. Kim & Uzzi study the causes of breaking up 
between a great financial client and a law firm.
103 Working in a social 
network analysis framework, these authors find that the size of the financial 
client’s legal department is positively correlated with break up probability 
but as long as financial firm size increases this probability decreases.   
Similarly, financial firm’s perceived hierarchy is negatively associated with 
potential break up chance. It is also negatively associated the presence in 
the financial firm’s management board of law firm’s attorneys. Positively 
affects dissolution tie probability the quit of the law firm’s CEO, who is 
usually commanding big operations. Also positively affects the market 
condition: in a more competitive market (high presence of another law 
firms) breaking up probability increases because financial firm can find 
easily a replacement for the departed law firm.  
From inside a culture where relationships become crucial for 
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performance, Michelson checks how guanxi persists also in Chinese legal 
profession.
104 Lawyers are encouraged to establish links with as many 
government and non-government agents as possible for successfully 
accomplished their lawsuits. Social exchange theory remains vividly present 
in this case, when actors increase their power because other people 
dependence on the resources the former possessed.  
In a more Western facet of Chinese culture, social capital can also be 
employed for collective action promotion. Man shows how the level of 
connections between the Bar Association and the Legal Society of Hong 
Kong, with lots of member in common, allow them to jointly face glowing 
political issues soon after the sovereignty transference.
105 Social capital was 
employed in these cases, the author conjectures, for making coordinating 
actions that show to the new Chinese authorities the relative weight of the 
profession in Hong Kong society.  
Now on we are going to survey papers that verify the importance of 
social capital in small law firms. 
 
C.   Bridges in the Plains 
For small and mid law firms the search for clients is process that 
becomes gradually acquires greater relevance. Greater number of graduates 
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makes the labor market, whether in developed or undeveloped countries, 
being more crowed of professionals competing for clients. Baker makes the 
point on the importance of social capital as a firm asset.
106 However, social 
capital formation process begins in prior educational stages. 
Hansen finds that social capital is crucial for better job findings only in 
higher social class’s law graduates.
107 She studies a sample of Norwegian 
lawyers who show a high inequality on income levels even when they have 
obtained similar academic results. The puzzle is finally solved when 
lawyer’s social origin is identified. Those who proceed from higher social 
classes possess social networks that include prominent people that help for 
better job findings and deal with best pay lawsuits. However, Lee & Brinton 
article finds in South Korea that private social capital created by graduating 
from an elite university don’t bring any special feature for job finding.
108 In 
fact, in this country the best way for getting a good job is by applying for an 
interview. Also Bian refutes Granovetter’s hypothesis by finding that 
successful job finding in China is positively associated with a strong tie 
structure.
109 These works clearly suggest the influence of culture on 
accessing embedded resources in a network.  
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One aspect demarked by Seron and Fucito is lawyer socialization for 
strengthen their professional identity. Lawyers meet each other to share and 
discuss job issues, but also for friendship tie formation with another 
members of the legal community. This enhances a dense social network 
among local professionals that helps for identifying ‘what means to be 
lawyer in this community’. Felstiner quoted below, finds the dark side of 
this relation, given that this interaction also strengthens bad practices.
110  
At the same time, both investigations detect the presence of 
professionals that become aware on the need of using their social networks 
to survive beyond local bar norms and regulations. Many testimonies reflect 
this:    
“Getting clients was facilitated because of my embedding as employee in 
... (a public office). I advised [another] employees, I make myself known... 
Clients come to me because I’m sociable, I go to meetings, and that makes me 
more trustable and helps to get more litigations.”
111 
 
“In past times a typical lawyer sat down and said: ‘let the clients come’. 
Now if you do something and good, one has to go out and spread it out. 
Clients don’t come for themselves, one has to go and search them... I had 
client-subtraction problems. But there’s the [charges] ‘auction’. Clients see 
several lawyers, each one asks for a lesser bill that he is willing to pay, [then, 
with this process] he takes a decision.”
112 
 
“Clients come here for [personal] recommendations, that is typical in 
                                                                                                                            
Korea, SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 69, 1996. 
109 See Y. Bian, Bringing Strong Ties Back, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 62, 1997. 
110 See W.L.F. Felstiner, Professional Inattention: Origins and Consequences, in K. 
HAWKINS (ED.). THE HUMAN FACE OF THE LAW, Ch. 6 (Clarendon Press, 1997). 
111 See FUCITO, supra note 44 at 77 (translated from original in Spanish). 
112 See FUCITO, supra note 44 at 77 (translated from original in Spanish). 44  Juan M.C. Larrosa [24-Feb-05 
provincial towns. I was born here, I’m well known and have several clients, 
some of them were former primary school or high-school pals, another are 
known from the neighborhood, and another are sent by the first ones.”
113 
 
“I’m union trustee, I was union registrar.  That gave me [a level of] 
knowledge that allows me today to have clients. I had a public office job in 




“I get clients in the most diverse ways. I don’t any arrangement with any 
institution; they come because of relations, friendship, and acquaintances. 
Colleagues of mine get clients in the most diverse ways [also]: some [of them] 
are connected with political, social institutions. There are people who organize 
all of their social life in function of his work, for getting cases…”
115 
 




“Clients, households in majority, come here recommended and mainly 




“I’m a Protestant shepherd’s wife and most of my clients come from 
church; I mean, I have many clients in the religious community...”
118 
 
“In any small firm, suburban or country, when you begin to practice... you 
have to rely … in meeting people, and the way you do that is you join … 
clubs. You join the Elks… In my case, it was the Jaycees and the B’nai B’rith 
and the local Democratic Party and the local political party. And that’s how 
you meet people, because you become active and involved in things. [I’ve 
been] past state council for the Jaycees; … [I’ve] been an officer in the Elks; I 




“... Once I put an advertisement in the newspaper… and I dare to state 
that nobody goes to a lawyer because of a newspaper advertisement. He goes 
because he knows him or because he knows who recommends him. It’s an 
issue of personal relationship. I was city councilor, I’m [political] party 
member... and because of that I have participation in many non-profit entities 
in town.”
120  
                                                 
113 See FUCITO, supra note 44 at 78 (translated from original in Spanish). 
114 See FUCITO, supra note 44 at 78 (translated from original in Spanish). 
115 See FUCITO, supra note 44 at 79 (translated from original in Spanish). 
116 See FUCITO, supra note 44 at 80 (translated from original in Spanish). 
117 See FUCITO, supra note 44 at 80 (translated from original in Spanish). 
118 See FUCITO, supra note 44 at 82 (translated from original in Spanish). 
119 See SERON supra note 12 at 52. 
120 See FUCITO, supra note 44 at 82 (translated from original in Spanish). 24-Feb-05]   CONNECTIONS, SPECIALIZATION, & LAWSUITS  45 
 
“Client’s source is usually friends that recommends another. Men get 
clients because they go to a club or because they meet in a [social club]... ”
121 
 
“I daresay I probably get 75 percent of my clients from clients... Is that 
high? Well, 65 to 75 percent –somewhere in that neighborhood. And I get 
maybe what? 5 percent of new clients who just walk in off the street. Some 
referrals from family and friends and social connections, that type of [thing], 
which basically boils down into friends also.”
122 
 
“I obtain cases by entailment and advertisement. But there’s an enormous 
constraint in the Province, in concerns of advertisement because they don’t 
allow spotting the law firm specialty, nor the curriculum vitae, finding us in 
great disadvantage relate to other professionals. The local bar is highly 
conservative and inflexible towards norm enforcement.”
123 
 
“Clients are sent by another clients. Here people label lawyers. For 
instance, it is assumed that women practice Family [law] and if there is a 
person who dedicates to successions, then he gets all wills but he seldom will 
have an execution, because everybody think he doesn’t do it.”
124 
 
These statements give a fast survey on the ways social networks shape 
professional practice y serve as bridges over the practice restrictions that 
impose local Bars. Social capital and its sources (religion, non-government 
entities participation, political parties, public exposure, word-of-mouth 
diffusion
125, among others) are accounted across these testimonies. It can 
also be compared similarities between Seron and Fucito’s findings. They 
both coincide on the description of several features at the plains of the 
practice, whether in New York suburbia or in small towns and cities of the 
                                                 
121 See FUCITO, supra note 44 at 83 (translated from original in Spanish). 
122 See SERON supra note 12 at 53. 
123 See FUCITO, supra note 44 at 85 (translated from original in Spanish). 
124 See FUCITO, supra note 44 at 86-87 (translated from original in Spanish). 
125 Other researchers also detect word-of-mouth advertising as main lawyers’ client-getting 
tool. See H.M. Kritzer & J.K. Krishnan, Lawyers Seeking Clients, Clients Seeking 
Lawyers: Sources of Contingency Fee Cases and Their Implications for Case Handling, 46  Juan M.C. Larrosa [24-Feb-05 
province of Buenos Aires.  
With a strong focus on female professional participation, Seron detects 
again differences in the social capital formation and use according to 
gender.
126 This way, men have greater socialization levels that women 
because of full utilization of previously built social networks that are 
completely exploited for the professional practice. They have also greater 
time availability and greater peer connections, as mentioned above that 
convey subtle information flows on how and where to obtain clients. On the 
other hand, women lack such time versatility for socializing and neither 
they exploit their previously built social network for promoting their 
services. Finally, it is portrayed a little dark side of social capital: family 
members and friends that arrive for free legal advice. These end wasting 
valuable time without payment and the possibility of denying results in 
punishments á la Coleman. 
However, the survey leave question of capital crossed effects 
unanswered. We continue by exploring these interaction effects between 
both capital dimensions. 
 
5. CROSSROADS: CAPITAL INTERACTIONS 
Under diverse circumstances it is difficult to determine if some 
                                                                                                                            
LAW & POLICY 21, 1999.  
126 See SERON supra note 12 at 65-66. 24-Feb-05]   CONNECTIONS, SPECIALIZATION, & LAWSUITS  47 
professional achievement has been obtained because of individual 
preparation or through the use of some embedded resource or maybe both. 
Individual preparation, in the professionals’ case, has been obtained thru the 
pass from university. However, this very same experience usually generates 
a solid social network that is later used with labor purposes. Likewise, the 
search for a specific knowledge or expert advice in law firms could allow 
them to amplify their contact network that enhances its social capital. In 
these examples, human capital is upgrading by the use of social capital but 
the inverse could be observed also. We’re going to survey papers that 
establish these complementarities.  
An interesting subject is the importance of religion in human capital 
formation. This way, an exploratory work as Lehrer suggests that 
membership to determined religious groups, with the consequent norms and 
believes acceptance, can affect the level and quality of acquired human 
capital.
127 In a parallel way, and as Greeley suggested
128, Heinz, Laumann 
& Nelson find that religion is associated to certain professional patterns in 
Chicago Bar. For instance, religion is a significant variable that explains the 
number of voluntary work lawyers get involved to.
129 And this is directly 
related with their social capital level. Both papers illustrate on how a same 
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source generates both capital dimensions. 
For accessing mentorship benefits, mentioned in Section 3.A, relies 
several times on the social network we possess. Higgins focus in big law 
firms’ women and finds that those who developed a mentorship social 
network obtain greater levels of career satisfaction.
130 Finally, Kraimer and 
his coauthors study an heterogeneous group of university graduates and find 
again that best connections help for career advancement because they 
facilitates the access to resources, information and career support 
(mentorship).
131 On the same way, Fucito
132 and Seron
133 observe that 
mentorship also appears in small law firms or solo practices. It usually 
occurs when a mature lawyer take a younger one under his wing and teach 
him the occupational hazards. But this human capital transference greatly 
depends on the social networks already created (this is more clearly 
observed in ethnic minorities neighborhoods) and the embedded resources 
that could be accessed. Luck plays its part also. 
In terms of their effect on income, Dixon & Seron find in USA that 
many human and social capital variables that have positive effect on men’s 
income don’t show effect at all in the case of women.
134 However, dos 
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human capital variable are significant on income determination in men and 
women altogether: experience and perceived class rank (a variable that 
identifies peers perception on one’s reputation.  
On the other side, Okamoto also observes the intermediation functions 
that exert lawyers with higher reputation.
135 Many top firms drawn upon big 
law firms instead of their own legal department because of reputation: 
simply the best firms consult the best law firms. They not only obtain the 
best legal advice, as results of several years of experience in the practice of 
a specific law branch, but they share both reputations and increase them too. 
It is a good deal for both of them. They just simply pool commercially their 
trademark with that of the best law firm that grants a prime for reputation 
and status for both.
136 Definitively, relationships are created for calculatedly 
affects relevant third part perceptions.
137  
Conceptually it’s assumed that professional work time is well 
demarcated from private lifetime. In fact, a clear distinction between time in 
the job and time dedicated to home is a keystone in modern labor contracts, 
including professionals. However, a closer look complicates this distinction. 
Professional work places are actually fluid and permeable given that they 
include an open series of processes and informal and implicit demands such 
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as a more intimate relationship with the client for satisfaction assurance or 
more strict and non-negotiable deadlines.
138 This not means that 
professionals don’t appreciate their free time
139 but that firms have become 
greedy.
140 Under this conjecture, Ferris & Seron use data of time allocated 
at work for pointing out gender differences in time used behavior.
141 They 
find that men get a higher degree of control on their labor schedules but 
women, with their familiar responsibilities, are prone to make higher 
sacrifices in terms of promotions. Likewise, being married and having 
children give more labor autonomy to men and lower to women, making 
that the same marital status brings opposite results according to gender. The 
book by Epstein and her colleagues also represents a comprehensive study 
of this specific subject: time disposition for professional work as a 
determinant of success in the career.
142 In this case, lawyers are themselves 
compelled to maintain the reputation and prestige of being ‘all time 
available’ to clients with the consistent lack of social and family time make 
them forced to make a career choice. Again, women are bad positioned for 
raise time sacrifice and time allocated in childbearing is assessed as lack of 
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commitment to the firm. As consequence, they don’t are no competition for 
a male available full-time. This paper shed light on particular aspects of the 
professional life: visualization after hours is observed as expression of 
commitment to the firm and extra-work time for social capital formation 
with other colleagues. They both results key attitudes for obtaining a 
promotion (‘the partner that don’t see you, won’t promote you’, recalled 
one interviewed). Sterling & Reichman find something similar respect to 
professional career development areas in law professionals.
143 Women are 
hired in similar proportions than men but only a strict minority become 
firm’s associate. This makes that labor mobility in women is higher that 
men (they quit and (i) go to another law firm, (ii) do part-time practice or 
(iii) leave the profession.) Their qualitative research basically detects three 
areas where their male peers poorly assess women: commitment 
expressions toward firm and ability for mentoring younger peers. At the 
same time, part-time lawyer stigma and the correlated lack of social capital 
can be compensated by specializing in the practice, which opens a niche 
that make them desirable for their supervisors.
144 Here, it’s detected a 
replacement effect between a kind of capital and the other.  
A research by Bosma and his coauthors confirm the presence of 
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complementarity between both capitals as a fundamental resource for 
survival rate of recently born firms, for higher benefit earning, and also for 
higher job creation.
145 All these are positively related to social and human 
capital firm level in a sample of 1,000 startup firms in Netherlands. Vinding 
who models it explicitly could observe another demonstration of 
complementarity presence.
146 Evidence shows that a firm connecting to 
knowledge generating institutions provokes an increasing level of its human 
capital level. These findings are quite interesting towards small and medium 
firms policies design and implementation that enhance a more flow 
connection between them and local research centers (universities, collegiate 
entities, among others.) 
Next section concludes the paper. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
The underlying subject of this survey backtracks us to basic forms of 
human evolution: to learn and to interrelate. Efficient management of both 
notions, which for knowledge categorizing have been sorted as individuals’ 
economic assets, conveys differential results in performance.  
Discernment of potential commercial growth in a flowing economic life 
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environment allows for the first essays in giving up some lethargy in the 
traditional way of professional practice. This way big law firms were born 
that depart from the rest of law private practice.  
Big law firms’ human capital improvement reaches zeniths of 
purification in several aspects. The process is highly efficient and 
demanding with a very neat organizational and economical rationality that 
posits real survivors in the firm board. In any case, up-or-out system is 
complemented with training programs and mentoring as with much actual 
flexibility. Improvement path is translated into job quality and, 
consequently, to bills what makes that only a big company can hire these 
services.  
On the other hand, small law firms must incur in specialization if firm 
operates in a big market or if the professional works part-time (supplanting 
its relative lesser social capital compared to those who work full-time). In 
smaller size markets, small law firms act usually as generalist, accepting 
cases as they arrive. Here, mentoring is also possible but this process is not 
institutionalized as in big law firms and depends also in lawyer’s good 
fortune. 
This way, we could see that inside big law firms, social capital has clear 
intra-organizational facets in issues like efficient labor division, as an 
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internal control instrument, and as an asset on the tournament players. It 
was also obvious the importance of inter-organizational social capital. 
Successful embeddedness allows big law firms to fix a reputation prime in 
pricing their services and facilitates getting new clients too. 
In the other hemisphere, intra-organizational social capital may results 
less relevant because the few actors involved and the usual informal 
management of these firms so it is hardly mentioned in the literature. 
However, inter-organizational social capital becomes a very efficient capital 
dimension specially when upraising competence compel professionals to go 
out and get clients in an active fashion and to offer clients a satisfying 
service that assures their fidelity.  
But are lawyers prepared for adequately serving themselves of these 
capital dimensions? Professor Felstiner answers this question negatively. He 
studies why lawyers recurrently lose clients.
147 He exposes that clients’ lack 
of attention by lawyers has an institutional background. Education and 
socialization in which lawyers intertwine once they graduated don’t help 
them to understand the importance of client-lawyer relationship, the ways of 
treating clients correctly and the manners in which they could guarantee that 
these clients would keep as clients and recommend more clients too. They 
are educated in this way and interactions with other professionals for 
reinforcing professional identity also reinforce these bad habits. At the end, 24-Feb-05]   CONNECTIONS, SPECIALIZATION, & LAWSUITS  55 
becoming a Law specialist could keep away the professional’s source of 
income: clients. 
Finally, both variables are found to be crucial for improving 
professional practice performance. Legal systems that have not show 
upgrading behavior in terms of facilitating or promoting bar association 
restrictions should ease private practice in terms of allowing professional to 
accomplish some of their business goals. Increasing arriving of competent 
and just-graduate lawyers to market only hasten entrant and establish 
lawyers for sharpen their skills in getting clients. Institutional papers from 
American and Canadian Bar associations do all focus on the same purpose: 
to alert their members on the expected changes and to suggest adaptation 
choices. Upgrading human capital level is highly associated to firm’s 
growth which its main machinery is lawyer’s brain. Good use of social 
capital, on its behalf, creates stability in demand and strength chances of 
expansion. Although at the end, the change in itself is a lawyer’s choice. 
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